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Gedney et al.: Historical Development: ACTS Program Formulation

ACTS Program Formulation
The following material has been extracted from "The Advanced Communications
Technology Satellite" book by Richard Gedney, Ron Schertler and Frank
Gargione.

Background Information
NASA had a very significant role in the establishment of satellite
communications, first with the Syncom program to prove the feasibility of the
geo-synchronous orbit and later with the ATS and CTS programs, which
developed the C and Ku bands and led to the establishment of the commercial
satellite communications industry. At this point, NASA directed its efforts to
other space endeavors, expecting that the industry would continue the needed
technology development to keep the industry viable and competitive.

NASA's Re-entry into Communication R&D
In 1974, several organizations began to assess the consequences of NASA's
decision to essentially eliminate satellite communication activities that focused on
commercial applications [11]. The Electronic Industries Association (EIA) issued
a position paper in January 1974, which urged NASA to reconsider its decision.
In January 1975, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
issued a similar report. It urged NASA to re-enter the communication satellite
field by sponsoring new families of application technology satellites. The report
argued that from 1960 to 1973, "the federal government took the dominant role in
communication satellite research and development, thereby providing the basis
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for low-risk operational system development by private enterprise in the 1960s
and 1970s."

In the fall of 1975, NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to
consider and report on the question: "Should federal research and development on
satellite communication be resumed and, if so, what is the proper federal role in
this field?" To undertake the study, the NRC formed a Committee on Satellite
Communications, under the auspices of the Space Application Board. After
studying this question, the consensus of the committee was that major advances in
communication satellite technology required government investment, particularly
in the areas where high technical risks were involved. This committee concluded
that satellite communication R&D was an appropriate federal responsibility, and
that NASA should resume the research and development activities needed to
provide the new technology for future commercial communication needs. The
NRC committee recommended, in a 1977 report [12], that NASA implement an
experimental satellite communication technology flight program based on an
assessment of need, technology projections, and service concept development. It
recommended that the technical design of any NASA experimental
communication satellite should support several end user service concepts, and that
appropriate user groups should assist in the conceptual definition of both the
needed technology and the experiments themselves.
Based on the results of the NRC report, the increasing demand for domestic voice,
video, and data traffic, and the foreign competition and prospects of trade
disparity, President Jimmy Carter saw fit to reinstate federal sponsorship of
communication satellite technology. Official sanction for NASA to resume its
responsibility was contained in the October 1978 Presidential Directive (PD-42).
This directive stated, "NASA will undertake carefully selected communication
technology R&D. The emphasis will be to provide better frequency and orbit
utilization approaches."
The NASA Satellite Communication Program for the 1980s
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In 1978, as a result of the Presidential Directive, NASA began the process of
rebuilding its R&D activities in the communication satellite arena [13,14,15]. The
future technology program was planned in cooperation with the National
Research Council's Space Applications Board Subcommittee on Satellite
Communications, whose membership consisted of leading common carriers,
spacecraft manufacturers, and representatives of communication users.
Market & System Studies
In this first phase of the NASA program, market and system studies were
conducted to determine future service demand and whether or not C- and Ku-band
satellites could satisfy it. Two contracts were awarded to common carriers:
Western Union Telegraph Company, and U.S. Telephone and Telegraph
Company, which was a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph
(ITT) [16,17]. The emphasis of these studies was to forecast the
telecommunications traffic that could be carried by satellite competitively. During
this same time frame, two other system studies were conducted: one each by
Hughes Aircraft and Ford Aerospace, with supporting studies by TRW, GE, and
the Mitre Corporation [18,19]. Their purpose was to identify the technology
needed to implement cost-effective and spectrum-conservative communication
systems. The results were combined to define potential commercial system
configurations that could address the market for trunking and customer premises
services that was expected in the early 1990s. System requirements derived from
these postulated commercial configurations formed the basis for the technology
development program that followed.
The market studies predicted that rapid growth in domestic voice, data, and video
traffic would lead to a five-fold increase in U.S. communication demands by the
early 1990s. A combination of these market projections and communication
satellite license filings with the FCC portended a saturation of North American
orbital arc capacity using the C- and Ku-band frequencies. To relieve the pressure
of this expanding market, the 30/20 GHz frequency band was needed. As a result,
the new NASA communication program for commercial application was named
the 30/20 GHz Program and was structured to:
•

•
•

Develop selective high-risk, 30/20 GHz technologies that focused on relief
of orbit and frequency congestion and developing new and affordable
services
Promote effective utilization of the spectrum and growth in
communications capacity
Ensure continued U.S. preeminence in satellite communications
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Satellite Addressable Market Demand
The technologies required to meet these objectives were judged to be of such high
technical risk that they were beyond the capability of any one company to finance.
In 1979, NASA designated the Lewis Research Center (LeRC) in Cleveland,
Ohio, to be its lead center in planning and executing the commercial
communication satellite technology R&D Program. In 1999, the Lewis Research
Center's name was changed to the Glenn Research Center (GRC), in honor of
John Glenn, astronaut and U.S. Senator from Ohio.
Early communication satellite systems employed simple, bent-pipe transponders
with a single antenna beam to cover a large region (such as the continental United
States). The new NASA program needed to develop technology that would allow
the frequency spectrum to be used more efficiently. One technique to accomplish
this was to cover the region with many small spot beams so that the same
frequency could be reused simultaneously in non-adjacent beams. Such frequency
reuse increased the capacity of satellites by a factor of five to ten times that of a
single beam satellite, with only a modest increase in spacecraft size, power, and
weight. The technology to accomplish this high degree of frequency reuse
employed antennas with high-gain spot beams and electronic systems with
onboard switching and processing to inter-connect the spot beams. In addition, the
high-gain antenna allowed for smaller aperture user terminals at higher data rates.
This was the technology developed by NASA.
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Technology Feasibility & Flight System Definition
In 1980, the program moved forward in two phases. The first phase was to 1)
continue the market studies to increase confidence in the forecast for orbit
saturation and 2) to do proof-of-concept development of the identified
technologies. The proof-of-concept program was a laboratory (breadboard) type
of development to prove that the technologies were feasible. Approximately $50
million was expended on the first phase. If the first phase proved successful, the
second phase would consist of developing an experimental flight system to
demonstrate that the technologies could provide reliable communications
services.
The first phase was fully supported by the entire service provider and satellite
manufacturing community. The second phase of the program was the one that
became controversial. The service providers had great concern about how reliably
the technology would work in space, and therefore, argued for a flight program.
Some satellite manufacturers, however, had reservations about proceeding with a
flight program because they felt it would give the winning contractors of the
NASA procurement an unfair competitive advantage. This controversy continued
throughout most of the life of the ACTS program.
Program Coordination with Industry
Two industry committees were formed to guide the program. The NASA Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee was created to provide general policy direction. The
committee included notable representatives of both the system supplier and
service supplier industry. Their contribution provided timely and sage review of
the program, as well as providing NASA with insight into the industry philosophy
relative to the roles and responsibilities of both government and the private sector.
The second industry committee was a Carrier Working Group (CWG), consisting
of representatives from all the major satellite service providers. The CWG was
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charged with helping NASA formulate the technology and flight system
requirements, develop experiments, and provide overall guidance. These
requirements and experiments were deemed necessary by the CWG to
demonstrate the readiness of not only the technology, but of its service
applications as well. Coordination was also established between the Department
of Defense and NASA, especially in the development of various critical advanced
technology components.
Proof-of-Concept Development
The purpose of the proof-of-concept (POC) technology development was to
demonstrate the technical feasibility of the key component building blocks
[20,21]. The approach NASA used was to issue multiple contracts to various
aerospace and related companies for the development of each high risk
technology: multiple spot beam antenna, base band processor, TWTA, wide-band
switch matrices, low-noise receiver, GaAs FET transmitter, GaAs IMPATT
transmitter, and ground antenna. Duplicate awards for most of the critical
technology components were employed to increase the probability of successful
development, and to produce multiple sources for communication hardware. In
addition, multiple awards helped to ensure that a variety of perspectives and
technical approaches were brought into each development. These contracts called
for the development of the technology, the construction of POC versions of the
components, and their testing in the laboratory to verify performance.
The POC hardware substantially reduced the risk associated with the planned
development of the flight system. Another product of these technology contracts
was the prediction of feasible component, subsystem, and system performance
levels. NASA used these performance predictions to provide guidance for follow
on technology development. Service providers and manufacturers could also use
these predictions in planning activities for the commercial system designs of the
early 1990s.
The Department of Defense (DOD) participated in the NASA POC program.
Several of the critical technology POC elements that were of interest to the DOD
were co-funded by DOD and NASA. To enable the effective transfer of
information that was generated in the program, all contractors were required to
prepare task completion reports. These reports were presented at periodic industry
briefings (only for interested U.S. parties) hosted by NASA.
Flight System Definition Studies
The need for a flight test program reflected the fact that much of the required
technology had never been demonstrated in space. The flight test was to ensure
that the technology base was mature and validated, providing the level of
confidence recommended by industry as being necessary for commercial
exploitation. The initial planning called for two experimental satellites to be built
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and flown; one to demonstrate telephone trunking for high volume users in
metropolitan areas, the second to demonstrate customer premises services using
small and inexpensive earth terminals located at customer locations.
In 1980, the two-flight concept was reduced to a single experimental spacecraft,
primarily emphasizing customer premises services. This proved to be a wise
decision since the introduction of fiber optics a few years later significantly
reduced the cost for terrestrial trunking services, making satellites noncompetitive.
In February 1982, Dr. Burt Edelson became NASA's associate administrator of
the Office of Space Science and Application, and played a very important role in
keeping the program alive. When the program was seriously threatened in 1982,
Dr. Edelson restructured the 30/20 GHz program by broadening its applicability
to the entire frequency spectrum for satellite communications. As a result, the
experimental satellite system was renamed the Advanced Communications
Technology Satellite (ACTS), and it focused primarily on the technology of
multi-beam antennas and associated onboard switching and processing.
Spacecraft capacity was reduced to a minimum for technical verification and
experimentation only.
Dr. Edelson provided key leadership for the ACTS program during his tenure at
NASA, and was a vocal proponent of the program and its benefits until his death
in 2002. Two other NASA managers who provided important leadership to the
NASA Communications Program were Joe Sivo and Bob Lovell. Joe Sivo was
the chief of the Communications and Applications division at NASA's Lewis
Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio. Joe was the "Father of ACTS" and led the
LeRC team in the late 1970s and the early 1980s as NASA restructured its
communication program. Bob Lovell became chief of the Communications
division at NASA Headquarters and worked with both Dr. Edelson and Joe Sivo
to structure the ACTS program and guide it through technical and political
hurdles in the early 1980s. Without Sivo, Lovell, and Edelson, the ACTS flight
program would have never gotten off the ground.
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Concurrent with the POC technology development, NASA was working with
industry to define flight system concepts that would demonstrate ACTS
technology readiness and its service capabilities. During the period of 1981-1983,
the major spacecraft manufacturers' Ford Aerospace (now Space Systems Loral),
Hughes Aircraft, TRW, GE, and RCA (both now part of Lockheed Martin) were
funded by NASA to conduct system studies for defining a R&D spacecraft
(ACTS) that could be flown by NASA. NASA then used the results from these
system studies to develop the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the ACTS
spacecraft and ground system. This RFP was issued by NASA in early 1983, with
a proposal due date of June 1, 1983. Since the RFP required the development of
very high-risk technology that had never been flown before, a cost-plus-fixed-fee
type of contract was specified.
The five separate flight system studies were conducted to get a wide range of
views on what the ACTS spacecraft configuration should be and to promote
competition for the procurement of the spacecraft. As it turns out, this process did
not accomplish the latter objective and was complicated by the fact that there was
not a clear consensus for the need for a flight program to prove the feasibility of
the new technology.
The Reagan administration espoused a minimal government involvement
ideology. At the time, the Republican administration took the position that it was
not the proper role of government to conduct a flight program for the purpose of
proving technology for commercial purposes, especially for a profitable industry.
There were many arguments presented by the Republican administration as to
why the government should not sponsor the flight verification. These included
arguments that the government was not capable of predicting technology for
commercial application, and that the spot beam, frequency-reuse technology was
not necessary because there was plenty of C-and Ku-band spectrum for future use.
However, as we know today, the use of spotbeams allows a great increase in the
amount of frequency reuse so that a single satellite can have a very large capacity.
Without this spot beam increase in capacity, many of the mobile and broadband
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satellite systems under development in the late 1990s, such as Iridium, Globalstar,
Spaceway, Astrolink, and iSKY (formerly called KaStar), would not have been
economical. All the developers of these systems make a strong case that their spot
beam systems meet the current FCC requirement to more efficiently use the
spectrum. The FCC has added this requirement since they realized that the
frequency spectrum is a scarce resource.
The US Congress in the 1980s was increasingly concerned about the country's
economic competitiveness in high technology industries. Legislators were
sensitive to areas such as satellite communication being challenged by foreign
entities, where the federal government could improve U.S. competitiveness. The
Democratic Congress listened to the arguments of the U.S. commercial satellite
industry in support of a flight verification program and decided it should be
conducted. This debate between the Republican administration and the
Democratic Congress (including each side's constituencies) over the need for the
ACTS flight test continued through launch of the ACTS in September of 1993.
Later chapters in the Gedney et al. book cover this debate in much more detail. It
is sufficient here to say that the difference in philosophy between the White
House and Congress was great enough that Reagan's budget left the program
without funds for five years in a row, and that Congress restored the funds in each
budget during those five years. If nothing else, the ACTS program may have set a
record in this regard.
Bidding on the ACTS Contract
The response to the ACTS RFP was disappointing because only one proposal was
received. The team submitting the proposal consisted of RCA as prime integrating
contractor and supplier of the spacecraft bus, with first-tier sub-contractors TRW
(for the communication payload) and COMSAT (for the Master Control Station).
Second-tier subcontractors included Motorola for the base band processor and
Electromagnetic Sciences (now called EMS Technologies) for the spacecraft's
antenna beam-forming network. Since TRW, Motorola, and Electromagnetic
Sciences had developed major pieces of the ACTS technology in the proof-ofconcept development program, this team was very competent. Because the team
represented a large cross-section of the U.S. industry involved in satellite
communications, NASA believed that objectives of the program could still be
achieved by the single bid.
ACTS was to be placed into a low earth orbit by NASA's space shuttle, and the
RFP required that the payload be constrained to as small a space in the shuttle's
cargo bay as possible. One option was to use a Payload Assist Module PAM-D
perigee stage to place ACTS into a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) after
deployment from the shuttle. Some pre-proposal studies showed that this
approach would result in the ACTS only using one quarter of the shuttle's cargo
bay volume. The next alternative was to use a larger capacity perigee stage "a
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PAM-A" which would take up more volume in the cargo bay. NASA wanted to
restrict the payload's volume in the cargo bay to limit the total cost of the mission,
including launch. At this time, shuttle launch costs were based on the volume
occupied in the cargo bay. This logic was somewhat questionable since the shuttle
was not always flown with a full load. In fact, the NASA cost model used a
shuttle load factor of 3/4 capacity to determine the pricing for payloads. Potential
bidders questioned this requirement and sought a change. Prior to the receipt of
proposals on June 1, 1983, Robert Berry, director of Space System Operations at
Ford Aerospace, wrote to NASA on May 3, 1983, [22] and stated the following:
"We believe that the technical approach which would create the least risk to
NASA would be a PAM-A configuration satellite, unconstrained by the volume
limitations of the PAM-D family of perigee stages. We have made the case that it
is in NASA's best interest not to discourage the offer of a PAM-A configuration.
It seems obvious to us that NASA's objectives in achieving an ACTS program
offering innovative and unique associations with other government or commercial
users can only be satisfied with a PAM-A equivalent spacecraft. We further
believe that as the definition of NASA's high technology payload evolves, weight,
power, footprint area, thermal considerations, and performance margins will move
toward the limitation of the PAM-D configuration. On the other hand, ample
margin would still exist with a PAM-A configuration."
Ford Aerospace had planned to offer a PAM-A class spacecraft for the ACTS
mission. We also had received notification from another payload user of their firm
commitment for another payload, which would have been incorporated, on our
satellite configuration along with the ACTS payload. In addition, we had been
informed by a satellite operating company of its interest in leasing the ACTS
payload, thus providing potential cost reimbursement to NASA. However, RFP 3511907 quantitatively defines the assignment of launch costs to overall program
costs, but offers no quantitative offset for the substantially greater capability of a
PAM-A configuration. This quantitative imbalance confers an apparent
competitive cost advantage to a PAM-D class satellite configuration even though
that configuration will not support the full achievement of NASA's overall
program objectives. Should NASA subsequently decide that a PAM-A equivalent
configuration is desirable for ACTS, Ford Aerospace would be pleased to offer a
competitive solution.
In a December 1983 Aviation Week & Space Technology article [23], Berry went
further and said, "There is no way the ACTS payload is compatible with the
McDonnell Douglas Delta (PAM-D) class upper stage." It was expected that the
ACTS contractor would use a standard commercial bus to limit the non-recurring
costs for the spacecraft. Ford Aerospace wanted to bid its standard PAM-A bus,
which evidently would have taken up considerable volume in the shuttle. They
must have perceived that this would have made them non-competitive, so
therefore did not bid. As it turned out, Berry's statement that the ACTS weight
requirement was beyond the PAM-D capability was true. When RCA bid the
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ACTS job, they proposed a PAM-A con-figuration with the antenna reflectors
folded across the top of the spacecraft to minimize the volume taken up in the
shuttle. Not long after the contract was awarded, the folded reflector design was
replaced with a truss structure arrangement that significantly increased the needed
volume in the cargo bay.
When ACTS was launched, it took up approximately one half of the cargo bay's
volume. NASA's concern with limiting shuttle costs and its procurement
regulations forbidding informal discussions with potential bidders after release of
the RFP, resulted in improper treatment of a contractor's input. In hindsight, it is
obvious that it would have been better for the program had the shuttle launch
costs not been included in the proposal evaluation. The result would have been the
receipt of two proposals instead of one. The other major potential bidder for
ACTS was Hughes Aircraft Company. Although the reasons were not publicly
stated, Hughes chose not to submit a bid for ACTS.
Hughes Ka-band Filing
Hughes questioned the ACTS program in principle as unnecessary subsidization
of commercial operations and duplication of military technology development. To
emphasize their point, they filed an application with the FCC in early December
of 1983 for the development, launch, and operation of a two-satellite Ka-band
domestic system. Their satellites were to be equipped with high-power spot beams
focused on 16 major U.S. metropolitan areas. As such, it would allow the use of
two meter customer-premises earth stations for business data services such as
teleconferencing, high-speed document distribution, and remote printing. The first
of their two proposed satellites was to be launched in December of 1988.

Hughes noted in this filing that they expected the orbital allocations at the C- and
Ku-bands to be exhausted following the next round of FCC assignments. In
essence, Hughes agreed with NASA's C- and Ku-band saturation projections,
which had been derived by Western Union. In fact, Hughes quoted the Western
Union market study in their filing. This filing, however, was contrary to other
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statements made by Hughes during the same time period that warned of a coming
glut in transponder capacity. This contradiction and other factors led to
speculation by observers [5] that Hughes opposed the ACTS flight program on
purely competitive grounds.
Nothing ever came of the Hughes filing, but it did set the stage for consistent
Reagan administration opposition to ACTS. The administration turned against
continuing ACTS as a flight program after Hughes filed with the FCC. Since
ACTS and Hughes' system used the same 30/20 GHz frequencies, senior Hughes
executives argued against continuing the program before the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and NASA, claiming that a government-funded
program would be redundant. When the Reagan administration sent its budget
proposal for NASA to Congress at the end of January 1984, it reduced the funding
to so small a level that a flight program could not proceed.
ACTS Contract Signed
In the ensuing months, a battle over the ACTS flight program was waged in the
U.S. Congress. Congress became convinced that the ACTS program objectives
were valid and important to carry out. In the latter part of May 1984, despite
administration opposition, they approved a $40 M increase for the ACTS program
to reinstate the flight verification phase. After President Reagan signed the FY
1985 authorization and appropriation bills, it cleared the way for a contract
signing with RCA on August 10, 1984, for the development of the ACTS flight
system. This funding battle over ACTS between the administration and Congress
continued for the next four years, with the administration trying to terminate
ACTS each year.
As initially proposed by RCA, ACTS system development was to take place over
a five-year period with an engineering model development being completed in
three years. Because of the complex coordination between the user terminals, the
master control station, and the onboard switch system in setting up on-demand
circuits, the development included a comprehensive, three-month test of the
ACTS ground system with the spacecraft. The proposed five-year development
time contrasts with the normal commercial satellite development of three years,
and reflects the fact that the ACTS technology was well beyond the current stateof-the-art. With the ACTS contract awarded in August of 1984, the scheduled
launch date was September of 1989.
As described in the Gedney et al book on ACTS, funding cutbacks, development
problems, and other difficulties caused the launch to be delayed until September
of 1993.
Changing Times
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What is the proper role of government in technology development? The NASA
ACTS program served a very important role in advancing satellite communication
because the commercial satellite communication industry in the 1980s could not
afford to take on the risk associated with the necessary technology.
The business climate in the 1980s was entirely different than in the late 90s.
Today, non-traditional satellite companies such as Motorola, iSKY, and Pasifik
Satelit Nusantara (PSN)-to name just three-have found investor partners to put up
billions of dollars for implementation of revolutionary satellite communication
systems employing advanced technologies. Iridium is a 66 25 LEO satellite
system that provides mobile communication anywhere in the world. iSKY is a
GEO satellite system that provides broadband communications for the consumer
Internet in the United States. In the case of PSN, the system is a GEO, handheld
mobile communications system called ACeS. All three systems use multiple spot
beam antennas, and both Iridium and AceS have on-board digital processing.
Iridium also has inter-satellite links to provide global connectivity. Because of the
success of many new satellite systems-such as NASA's ACTS, DOD's MilStar,
and Hughes' DirecTV-many satellite service providers now view new technology
not as a major risk factor but as a means to introduce new services. Another major
difference today is that the perceived market potential is much greater than it was
in the 1980s.
In the 1980s, communications satellites were still in their infancy and large sums
of capital were not available for risky ventures. The ACTS flight program was a
proper role for the government in the 1980s. Due to differences in the business
climate and the maturity of many technologies, a similar flight program is not
considered necessary today. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, "The
Role of Government in Technology Development" in the Gedney et al ACTS
book.
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